FireWatch: World Updates

The Ichthys LNG onshore facility, operated by Inpex, is located at Bladin Point near Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia and is regulated by the Northern Territory Environment Protection Authority (NT EPA) under an Environment Protection Licence issued in accordance with the Waste Management and Pollution Control Act. In recent months, the facility has faced heightened scrutiny after Inpex admitted in October 2025 to errors in its calculation and reporting of volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions, including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene. Following this disclosure, the NT EPA launched an immediate investigation, and additional concerns surfaced as workers reported exposure to toxic chemicals, oil spills, and inadequate management responses. Despite these issues, the Northern Territory’s Chief Health Officer has stated that current monitoring shows no evidence of increased health risks to the community.

On 10 November 2025 at approximately 3:10 PM, a fire broke out inside the Tank 2 dehydration bed at the Bladin Point Ichthys facility. This area of the process plant, which forms part of the gas-processing train, contains hydrocarbon gases, molecular sieve dehydration media, high operating temperatures, and high-pressure systems. Any fire or thermal runaway in such a unit is considered a high-hazard scenario requiring high-capacity fixed firewater protection, including dedicated fire water ring mains and both diesel and electric fire-water pumps capable of delivering large volumes of water. According to Inpex, the incident was managed in accordance with established emergency response protocols and was quickly extinguished. The rapid control of the fire strongly suggests that the fire-water system—including its pumps—operated effectively, delivering sufficient pressure and flow for deluge cooling or fire-monitor operation.

No injuries were reported, and both Inpex and regulators stated that the fire caused no environmental damage. NT WorkSafe was notified of the event, and the NT EPA began assessing whether any environmental harm may have occurred. Inpex publicly reiterated its commitment to cooperate fully with all regulatory authorities. As part of such investigations, regulators typically evaluate the performance of critical emergency systems, including fire-water pumps, reviewing maintenance records, pressure-test logs, system reliability, and whether the pumps delivered adequate flow rates to the affected zone.

At facilities such as Ichthys LNG, emergency response protocols depend heavily on the proper operation of fire-water pumps. These pumps must start automatically when header pressure drops, remain operable during total power loss through diesel-driven units, and provide N+1 redundancy so that protection remains available even if a pump fails. Given the speed at which the Tank 2 fire was extinguished, it is likely that the pumps auto-started as designed, maintained stable system pressure without cavitation or trip events, and provided the necessary flow to suppress the fire and prevent its escalation to adjacent equipment.

Several underlying issues contextualize the incident. An internal review at Inpex showed that emissions reported for the 2023–24 financial year were significantly lower than recalculated values: total VOCs were originally reported as 1,618.83 tonnes compared to a recalculated 3,562.3 tonnes; benzene was reported at 4.12 tonnes versus a recalculated 556.9 tonnes; and toluene was reported at 5.05 tonnes compared to a recalculated 569.8 tonnes. Inpex stated that these discrepancies were unintentional and that emissions from previous years were being reviewed, further noting that ongoing air-quality monitoring continued to show emission levels within government guidelines. Worker safety concerns have also emerged, with employees reporting chemical exposure, oil-related burns, and a culture of disregarding environmental or safety alarms. Some workers claimed that critical pollution-control equipment, such as acid gas incinerators, had been offline at times.

Compounding these concerns, a significant oil spill occurred in October 2025, during which approximately 36,000 litres of heating-medium oil leaked at the facility. Some of this oil entered stormwater drains and nearby mangrove areas, although testing reportedly did not detect contamination beyond the site’s boundaries. In terms of community health, the NT Chief Health Officer maintains that even with revised emissions data, no increased risk has been identified through existing monitoring programs. The NT EPA continues to work with health authorities to evaluate long-term risks associated with the facility’s operations.

From a technical and regulatory perspective, fire-water pumps at LNG facilities such as Ichthys must comply with recognized design standards, including NFPA 20 (Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection) and AS 2941 (Fixed Fire Protection Installations). These standards require at least two pumps—typically one electric and one diesel—automatic start on demand, continued operability during plant shutdowns, and routine weekly or monthly testing. A fire in a dehydration unit, such as the one experienced at Tank 2, is precisely the type of event these standards are intended to address. The rapid containment of the incident reinforces the likelihood that the fire-water pumps and associated fire-protection systems functioned as required, supplying the water necessary for deluge cooling, fire suppression, and preventing escalation to adjacent process units.

The incident presents several broader implications and risks. From a regulatory standpoint, the fire adds to the growing pressure on Inpex amid previous environmental issues such as the oil spill and emissions under-reporting. Reputational risk is also significant, as worker complaints and ongoing investigations could damage the company’s standing locally and among broader stakeholders. Health and environmental concerns, particularly the dramatic under-reporting of benzene—a known carcinogen—raise long-term risk considerations even if immediate exposure appears low. Operationally, a fire in a dehydration unit may indicate potential deficiencies in maintenance or process safety, suggesting systemic vulnerabilities that could pose future threats to safety, reliability, and business continuity.